Readings for Economics 399: Experimental Economics

Class 1:

[4] Camerer, Colin, 2003, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Appendices to Chapter 1.

[5] Davis, Douglas and Holt, Charles, 1993, Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Chapter 1.

[6] Friedman, Daniel and Sunder, Shyam, 1994, Experimental Methods: a primer for economists. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chapters 1-3.

Class 2:

[2] Davis, Douglas and Holt, Charles, 1993, Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Chapter 3.

Class 3:

[3] Dohmen, Thomas, Falk, Armin, Huffman, David, Sunde, Uwe, Schupp, Jurgen et al., 2005, Individual risk Attitudes: New evidence from a large, representative, experimentally-validated survey, IZA DP No. 1730.

[4] Coller, Maribeth and Williams, Melonie B., 1999. Eliciting Individual Discount Rates. Experimental Economics, 2(2), 107-127.

[6] Meier, Stephan and Sprenger, Charles, 2007, Impatience and Credit Behavior: Evidence from a field experiment, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper 07-3.

Class 4:

[3] Sunder, S., 1995, Experimental Asset Markets. In: J. Kagel and A. Roth (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

[4] Dufwenberg, Martin, Lindqvist, Tobias and Moore, Evan, 2005, Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment on Speculation, American Economic Review, 95(5), 1731-37.

[5] Noussair, Charles and Tucker, Steven, 2006, Futures Markets and Bubble Formation in Experimental Asset Markets, Pacific Economic Review, 11(2), 167-184.

[6,8] Friedman, Daniel and Sunder, Shyam, 1994, Experimental Methods: a primer for economists. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chapters 7&8.

Class 5:

[3] Carpenter, Jeffrey, Holmes, Jessica and Matthews, Peter, 2008. Charity Auctions: A Field Experiment. The Economic Journal, 118(1), 92-113.

[4] Kagel, John H., 1995, Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research. In: John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 501-585.

[5] Schram, Arthur, Onderstal, Sander, 2009, Bidding to Give: An experimental comparison of auctions for charity, International Economic Review, 50(2), 431-457.

[6] Goeree, J. K., Maasland, E., Onderstal, S. and Turner, J., 2005. How (Not) to Raise Money, Journal of Political Economy, 113(4): 897-918.

Class 6:

[2] Elster, Jon, 1989, The Cement of Society: a study of social order. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

[3] Gueth, Werner, Schmittberger, Rolf and Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367-388.

[6] Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2003. Is Fairness Used Instrumentally? Evidence from Sequential Bargaining. Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(4), 467-489.

[7] Roth, Alvin, 1995, Bargaining Experiments. In: John Kagel and Alvin Roth (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 253-348.

Class 7:

[1] Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J., Savin, N.E. and Sefton, M., 1994. Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 347-369.

[3] Carpenter, Jeffrey, Burks, Stephen and Verhoogen, Eric, 2005, Comparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games. In: Jeffrey Carpenter, Glenn Harrison and John List (Eds.), Field Experiments in Economics. Research in Experimental Economics. JAI/Elsevier, Greenwich, Conn. and London, pp. 261-290.

[4] Eckel, C. and Grossman, P., 1996. Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 16, 181-191.

[5] Benz, Matthias and Meier, Stephan, 2008, Do People Behave in Experiments as in Real Life? Evidence from donations, Experimental Economics, 11(3), 268-281.

[6] Carpenter, Jeffrey, Liati, Allison and Vickery, Brian, 2009, They Come to Play: Supply effects in an economic experiment, Rationality & Society, forthcoming.

[8] Carpenter, Jeffrey, Verhoogen, Eric and Burks, Stephen, 2005. The Effect of Stakes in Distribution Experiments. Economics Letters, 86(3), 393-398.

[9] Fong, Christina, 2007, Evidence from an Experiment on Charity to Welfare Recipients: Reciprocity, Altruism and the empathic responsiveness hypothesis, the Economic Journal, 117(522), 1008-1024.

Class 8:

[1] Berg, Joyce, Dickaut, John and McCabe, Kevin, 1995. Trust, Reciprocity and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142.

[2] Burks, Stephen V., Carpenter, Jeffrey P. and Verhoogen, Eric, 2003. Playing Both Roles in the Trust Game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51(2), 195-216.

[3] Cox, James C., 2004. How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 260-281.

[4] Karlan, Dean, 2005. Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions. American Economic Review, 95(5):1688-99.

[5] Barr, Abigail, 2003. Trust and Expected Trustworthiness: Experimental Evidence from Zimbabwe. The Economic Journal, 113(489), 614-630.

[7] Fehr, Ernst and Gaechter, Simon, 2001, Fairness in the Labour Market – A Survey of Experimental Results. In: Friedel Bolle and Marco Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (Eds.), Surveys in Experimental Economics. Bargaining, Cooperation and Election Stock Markets. Physica Verlag.

Class 9:

[2] Fehr, Ernst, Kosfeld, Michael and Weibull, Jorgen, 2003, The Game Prisoners (Really) Play, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper.

[3] Burks, Stephen, Carpenter, Jeffrey and Goette, Lorenz, 2009, Performance Pay and the Erosion of Worker Cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experimental, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 70(3), 459-469.

[5] Ostrom, Elinor, Gardner, Roy and Walker, James, 1994, Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Chapter 5.

[6] Ledyard, John, 1995, Public Goods: a survey of experimental research. In: John Kagel and Alvin Roth (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 111-194.

[7] Cardenas, J.C., Stranlund, J. and Willis, C., 2000. Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out. World Development, 28(10), 1719-1733.

Class 10:

[2] Carpenter, Jeffrey, 2007. Punishing Free-Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods. Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 31-51.

[3] Carpenter, Jeffrey, 2007. The Demand for Punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(2), 522-542.

[4] Masclet, David, Noussair, Charles, Tucker, Steven and Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2003. Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. American Economic Review, 93(1), 366-380.

[5] Carpenter, Jeffrey and Matthews, Peter, 2005, Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation, or Reciprocity, Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Working Paper 0503.

[6] Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs, 2004. Third Party Punishment and Social Norms. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63-87.

[7] Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008, Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?, Journal of Public Economics, 92(1-2), 91-112.

Class 11:

[1] Harrison, Glenn and List, John, 2004. Field Experiments. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(December), 1009-1055.

[2] Cardenas, Juan Camilo and Carpenter, Jeffrey, 2008, Behavioral Development Economics: Lessons from field labs in the developing world, Journal of Development Studies, 44(3), 337-364.

[3] List, John, 2004. Young, Selfish and Male: Field Evidence of Social Preferences. The Economic Journal, 114(January), 121-149.

[4] Carpenter, Jeffrey and Seki, Erika, 2005, Do Social Preferences Increase Productivity? Field experimental evidence from fishermen in Toyama Bay, IZA Discussion Paper 1697.

[5] Cardenas, Juan Camilo and Carpenter, Jeffrey, 2005, Three Themes on Field Experiments and Economic Development. In: Jeffrey Carpenter, John List and Glenn Harrison (Eds.), Field Experiments in Economics. JAI Press, Greenwich, pp. 71-124.

Class 12:

[1] Camerer, Colin, Loewenstein, George and Prelec, Drazen, 2005. Neuroeconmoics: How neuroscience can inform economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 43(1), 9-64.

[2] Rustichini, Aldo, 2005. Neuroeconomics: Present and future. Games and Economic Behavior, 52, 201-212.

[3] Fehr, Ernst, Fischbacher, Urs and Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences. American Economic Review, 95(2), 346-351.

[4] de Quervain, Dominique, Fischbacher, Urs, Treyer, Valerie, Schellhammer, Melanie, Schnyder, Alfred et al., 2004. The Neural Basis for Altruistic Punishment. Science, 305(27 August), 1254-1258.

[5] Kosfeld, Michael, Heinrichs, Markus, Zak, Paul, Fischbacher, Urs and Fehr, Ernst, 2005. Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature, 435(2), 673-676.

[6] Sanfey, A.G., Rilling, J.K., Aronson, J.A., Nystrom, L.E. and Cohen, J.D., 2003. The Neural Basis od Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game. Science, 300(13 June), 1755-1758.

[7] Rustichini, Aldo, Dickhaut, John, Ghirardato, Paolo, Smith, Kip and Pardo, Jose, 2005. A Brain Imaging Study of the Choice Proceedure. Games and Economic Behavior, 52, 257-282.

[8] Bhatt, Meghana and Camerer, Colin, 2005. Self-Referential Thinking and Equilibrium as States of Mind in Games: fMRI evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 52, 424-459.