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:: PROOFS, FORTHCOMING or BEING REVIEWED
Compensating Differentials in Experimental Labor Markets, with Peter Matthews and Andrea Robbett, IZA DP No. 8820.
Progressive Taxation in a Tournament Economy, with Peter Matthews and Ben Tabb, IZA DP No. 8369.
Motivating Agents: How much does the mission matter?, with Erick Gong, (formerly IZA DP No. 7602) Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.
Exploitation Aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents, with David Dolifka, IZA DP No. 7499.
Workplace Democracy in the Lab, with Philip Mellizo and Peter Matthews, (formerly IZA DP No. 5460) Industrial Relations Journal, 45(4): 313-328 (2014).
An Introduction to "Bucket Auctions" for Charity, with Jessica Holmes and Peter Matthews, Games and Economic Behavior, 88(1): 260-276 (2014).
Moral Hazard, Peer Monitoring and Microcredit: Field experimental evidence from Paraguay, with Tyler Williams, Oxford Development Studies, 42(1): 111-135 (2014).
Overconfidence is a Social Signaling Bias, with Stephen Burks, Lorenz Goette and Aldo Rustichini, Review of Economic Studies, 80(3): 949-983 (2013).
Cognitive Ability and Strategic Sophistication, with Michael Graham and Jesse Wolf, Games and Economic Behavior, 80(1): 115-130 (2013).
Self Selection and Variations in the Laboratory Measurement of Other-Regarding Preferences across Subject Pools: Evidence from one college student and two adult samples, with various co-authors (formerly IZA DP No. 5389), Experimental Economics, 16(2): 170-189 (2013).
Risk Attitudes and Well-Being in Latin America, with Juan Camilo Cardenas (formerly IZA DP No. 5279), the Journal of Development Economics 103(2):52-61 (2013).
Which Measures of Time Preference Best Predict Outcomes? Evidence from a large-scale field experiment, with Stephen Burks, Lorenz Goette and Aldo Rustichini (formerly IZA DP No. 5808), the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 84(1): 308-320 (2012).
Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments, with Shachar Kariv and Andrew Schotter (formerly IZA DP No. 5307), the Review of Economic Design 12(2): 93-118 (2012).
Crying Over Spilt Milk: Sunk Costs, Fairness Norms, and the Hold-Up Problem, with Peter Matthews, Studies in Microeconomics 1(2): 113-129 (2013).
Dopamine Receptor Genes Predict Risk Preferences, TIme Preferences, and Related Economic Outcomes? with Justin Garcia and J. Loji Lum, the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 42(3): 233-261 (2011).
An Inter-Cultural Examination of Cooperation in the Commons, with Juan Camilo Cardenas, the Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(4): 632-651 (2011).
Jumping and Sniping at the Silents: Does it matter for charities? with Jessica Holmes and Peter Matthews, the Journal of Public Economics 95(5-6): 395-402 (2011).
Do Social Preferences Increase Productivity? Field experimental evidence from fishermen in Toyama Bay (formerly IZA DP No. 1697), with Erika Seki, Economic Inquiry, 49(2): 612-630 (2011).
Endogenous Participation in Charity Auctions, with Jessica Holmes and Peter Matthews, the Journal of Public Economics 94(11-12): 921-935 (2010).
Why Volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, reputation and incentives, with Caitlin Myers, the Journal of Public Economics 94(11-12): 911-920 (2010). (Experiment protocol and survey instrument).
Charity Auctions in the Experimental Lab, with Jessica Holmes and Peter Matthews, In Research In Experimental Economics Volume 13 (pp. 201-249), Bingly: Emerald Group Publishing (2010).
Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity, with
Peter Matthews, the Journal of the European Economic Association 10(3): 555-572 (2012) (press coverage in the New York Times).
Experiments and Economic Development: Lessons from field labs in the developing world, with Juan Camilo Cardenas.
They Come to Play: Supply effects in an economic experiment, with Allison Liati and Brian Vickery, Rationality & Society, 22(1): 83-102 (2010).
Cognitive Skills Affect Economic Preferences, Strategic Behavior and Job Attachment (formerly IZA DP No. 3609), with Stephen Burks, Lorenz Goette and Aldo Rustichini, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, May 12, 2009; 106(19): 7745-7750. (Appendix) (press coverage in the Wall Street Journal)
Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a real effort experiment (formerly IZA DP No. 2972), with Peter Matthews and John Schirm, the American Economic Review, 100(1):504-17 (2010).
What Norms Trigger Punishment? with Peter Matthews, Experimental Economics, 12(3):272-288 (2009).
Norm Enforcement: The Role of Third Parties, with Peter Matthews, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 166(2): 239-258 (2010).
Strong Reciprocity and Team Production, with Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and Sung-Ha Hwang, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71(2): 221-232 (2009).
Using Behavioral Economic Field Experiments at a Large Motor Carrier: The context and design of the truckers and turnover project, with Stephen Burks, Lorenz Goette, Kristen Monaco, Aldo Rustichini and Kay Porter, NBER Working Paper No. 12976.
Performance Pay and the Erosion of Worker Cooperation: Field experimental evidence, with Stephen Burks and Lorenz Goette, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 70(3): 459-469 (2009).
Altruistic Behavior in a Representative Dictator Experiment, with Cristina Connolly and Caitlin Myers, Experimental Economics, 11(3): 282-298 (2008).
Charity Auctions: A Field Experiment, with Jessica Holmes and Peter Matthews, the Economic Journal, 118(January): 92-113 (2008), (press coverage in the Financial Times).
Behavioral Development Economics: Lessons from field labs in the developing world, with Juan Camilo Cardenas, the Journal of Development Studies, 44(3): 337-364 (2008).
Social Preferences, forthcoming in the (new) New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.
Fairness and Freight-Handlers: A Test of Fair-Wage Theory in a Trucking Firm, with Stephen Burks and Eric Verhoogen, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 60(4): 477-498 (2007).
Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1): 31-52 (2007).
The Demand for Punishment, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62(4): 522-542 (2007).
Space, Trust and Communal Action: Empirical Differences across Southeast Asian Cities, with Amrita Daniere and Lois Takahashi, Journal of Regional Science, 46(4): 681-705 (2006).
Competitive Work Environments and Social Preferences: Field experimental evidence from a Japanese fishing community, with Erika Seki, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, BE Press, 5(2), Article 2 (2006) .
Switch Backs: rethinking aspiration-based dynamics in the
ultimatum game, with Peter Matthews, Theory and Decision,
58(4):351-385 (June 2005).
Experiments in Economics: An Introduction, with Glenn
Harrison and John List, in Field Experiments in Economics, (JAI), eds. Jeffrey
Carpenter, Glenn Harrison, John List, pp. 1-16 (Spring 2005).
Themes on Field Experiments and Economic Development,
with Juan Camilo Cardenas, in Field Experiments in Economics,
(JAI), eds. Jeffrey Carpenter, Glenn Harrison, John List,
pp. 71-124 (Spring 2005).
Students to Workers: The Effects of Stakes, Social Framing,
and Demographics on Bargaining Outcomes, with
Stephen Burks and Eric Verhoogen, in Field Experiments
in Economics, (JAI), eds. Jeffrey Carpenter, Glenn Harrison,
John List, pp. 261-290 (Spring 2005).
the Effect of Stakes in Distribution Experiments,
with Stephen Burks and Eric Verhoogen, Economics Letters,
Trust and Social Capital in Southeast Asian Urban Slums,
with Amrita Daniere and Lois Takahashi, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 55(4):533-551 (December 2004).
with Community Descriptions, Experimental Instructions, and
Review of Radical Political Economics, 37(1):63-84 (Winter,
Punish? Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial
Norms, with Peter
Matthews and Okomboli Ong'Ong'a, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 14(4):407-429 (October
in Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods,
Journal of Socio-Economics, 33(4):395-408 (September, 2004).
of - Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from
experimental research, Elinor Ostrom and James Walker eds.,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 55(1):93-99,
Capital and Trust in Southeast Asian Cities, with
Amrita Daniere and Lois Takahashi, Urban Studies, 41(4):853-874
Escalation, Deference, and Spite: Strategies used in Labor-Management
Bargaining Experiments with Outside Options, with
McAndrew Rudisill, Labour Economics, 10(4):427-442 (August,
Fairness Used Instrumentally? Evidence from Sequential Bargaining,
Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(4):467-489 (August, 2003). (Regression
Both Roles in the Trust Game,with Stephen Burks and
Eric Verhoogen, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
51(2):195-216 (June, 2003).
Intentions and Emotions: Old versus New Psychological Game
Theory, with Peter Matthews, (Invited comment on Andrew
Colman's Cooperation, psychological game theory and limtations
of rationality in social interaction), Behavior and Brain
Sciences, 26(2):158-159 (April, 2003).
Outcomes as the Result of Coordinated Expectations: an experimental
study of sequential bargaining,Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 47(2):119-139 (April, 2003).
Fairness and Reciprocity in the Best Shot Game, Economics
Letters, 75(2):243-248 (April, 2002).
Social Capital: Adding Field Experimental Methods to the Analytical
Toolbox in Social Capital Economic Development
and the Environment, (Edward Elgar), eds. Sunder Ramaswamy,
Jonathan Isham and Thomas Kelly, pp. 119-137 (Fall, 2002).
Models of Bargaining: Comparing agent-based computational
and analytical approaches to understanding convention evolution
Computational Economics, 19(1):25-49 (April, 2002).
in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence
into a Theory of Local Collective Action, Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156(4): 661-683
:: WORKING PAPERS