Stephen J. Meyrick
There is no need to remind anyone with even a passing interest in Asian affairs that the average rate of economic growth in Asia over the last few decades has been phenomenal. There is sometimes a need to remind ourselves that this growth has been extremely uneven, both temporally and geographically. In understanding the evolution of shipping systems in Asiain particular of container shipping systems it is useful to think in terms of four phases in the Asian economic development:
And there are of course many countries that have yet to play a significant part in the Asian economic miracle. Some, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and perhaps India, are showing clear signs that they do not intend to remain in this group for much longer. Others, such as North Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan, have further to go. However, despite the differences in timing and pace with which economic development has proceeded, it remains true that, in aggregate, growth in the Asian economies has for several decades significantly outstripped that in the rest of the world. Figure 1 makes it clear that economic growth in the developing economies of Asia1 has consistently outstripped growth in every other region of the world. In each and every year between 1990 and 1995, growth in these countries was more than double the world average: on average it was three times.2 As a result, Asia's cumulative economic growth in recent years has far outstripped that of other regions of the world (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Cumulative Economic GrowthVarious Regions, 1989 to 1995
It is true that 1996 was not a great year for most Asian economies and 1997-98 has been even worse, given the region's economic tumult, including crises in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea.
Despite the region's economic woes in 1997-98, economic growth is expected to recover to within 5 years, and trade once again should drive this growth that has increased Asia's economic weight in the world economy.
In 1964, the combined GDP of the East Asian countries was approximately 4 percent of the world total. By 1992, this had risen to 25 percent, and it is estimated to rise to 33 percent by 2010.3
From the point of view of maritime trade, however, changes in the structure of Asian economies are as important as changes in their size. There are two critical factors here: the importance of trade, and changes in economic structure.
The growth model for almost all of the principal Asian economies has been based on trade:
'The newly industrialised countries of Asia are outstanding examples of the success of outward-looking strategies for economic development. Rapid growth in manufacturing output and incomes has been closely tied to rapid trade growth . . . resource endowment has dictated an obvious and binding rationale for outward-looking trade development strategies for the resource-poor countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia, but other Western Pacific developing countries have adopted the same policy course. While China's resource base is large in absolute terms, its population density is on average high, and its commitment to modernisation has also substantially increased trade dependence.'4
A 1995 ESCAP study of trade development in Asia and the Pacific estimated that the value of the merchandise exports of 16 major Asian economies had increased in value from US$312 billion in 1980 to $1.048 trillion in 1993. This represents a compound growth rate of approximately 10 percent over this period, compared with a world average of approximately 5 percent.5 Once again, while it is true that export growth rates for most Asian economies fell steeply in 1996, longer term forecasts suggest that the pattern of the recent past is most likely to continue: Project LINK model forecast are for exports from developing Asia to expand at a rate approximately 50 percent higher than the world average for the rest of the decade.
The second important feature of Asian economic growth is that is has been accompanied by a sectoral shift in economic activity away from primary production towards manufacturing.
This effect is even more marked in the traded goods sector. Table 1 below shows the share of manufactures in the exports and imports of the major developing Asian economies in 1994 compared to that in 1977.6
Table 1: Share of Manufacturing in Exports and Imports, 1977 and 1994
|
|
| |||
| 1977 | 1994 | 1977 | 1994 | |
| Korea | 84.9% | 93.4% | 53.9% | 69.6% |
| Taiwan | 84.9% | 93.9% | 56.4% | 77.2% |
| China | 48.6% | 81.8% | 63.6% | 86.3% |
| Hong Kong | 97.5% | 98.9% | 70.1% | 89.9% |
| Thailand | 23.5% | 71.7% | 64.3% | 79.5% |
| Malaysia | 25.8% | 74.7% | 25.8% | 74.7% |
| Singapore | 43.0% | 83.3% | 52.7% | 83.4% |
| Indonesia | 3.5% | 48.0% | 68.6% | 63.0% |
| Philippines | 18.2% | 45.0% | 53.5% | 60.5% |
Notes: China values are for 1980 and 1993; Hong Kong
includes re-exports.
Source: Derived from data in Asian Development Bank, Key
indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.
In all cases except Hong Kong, there has been a marked increase in
manufacturing share of exports. The increase is less extreme in the case of
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, because industrialization was already well
advanced in these economies by 1977. Perhaps equally noteworthy is that
manufacturing as a share of imports has increased substantially in all cases
except Indonesia.
This is reflected in the dynamics of shipping to and from the region. While
both dry and bulk shipments to and from the region have increased rapidly, the
real excitement has been in the container shipping, with the need to ship vastly
increased volumes of manufactured goods to, from, and within Asia, providing one
of the major forces that have led to a comprehensive reshaping of the world
shipping system.
But while the volume of Asian manufactures has increased rapidly, so has the
value. As the successive waves of economic development noted in the previous
section have occurred, each cohort of countries has moved up the ladder of
sophistication in manufacturing output, while lower-valued labor-intensive
manufacturing industries have migrated to the latest members of the development
club. This process has been facilitated and accelerated by massive flows of
foreign direct investment, as multinational companies based in "more advanced
economies shift their production and their simple processes to the less advanced
economies, which have cheaper and more abundant labour . . . with the strong
surge of FDI in the 1980s, sophisticated manufactures under Section 7 of the
SITC have become more important, increasing their share from 13 percent in 1980
to 25 percent in 1990."7
As the geographical spread of sophisticated manufacturing in Asia has
increased, so has the demand for sophisticated shipping services. The revolution
in logistics and manufacturing that began in trade between Japan and the United
States in the early 1980's has spread to many of the other more advanced Asian
economies, with integrated intermodal operations ensuring fixed-day door-to-door
delivery in a wide range of intercontinental and intra-Asian trades.
The big change of the last two decades in the geographical patterns of Asian
trade has been the increase in the level of Asia's trade with itself.
Intraregional exports grew in value from US$150 billion in 1985 to about
US$475 million in 1993. Whereas in 1985, intraregional exports represented 37
percent of total exports from Asia to the world, by 1993 this had risen to 45
percent. Moreover, the role that intra-Asian FDI has played in stimulating this
increase, combined with the higher propensity of foreign-owned firms to export
and the growing importance of intra-firm trade will continue to ensure that
trade of Asian countries with each will be the strongest component of Asian
trade growth for the foreseeable future.
Conventionally, the demand for maritime transport is divided into three major
components: dry bulk, liquid bulk and general cargo. The dry bulk sector,
formally defined as "dry cargo shipped in loose condition and of a homogeneous
nature," comprises a wide range of goods, dominated by a few major commodities:
we will deal explicitly with iron ore, coal and grain.8 Liquid
bulkessentially those cargoes which travel in tankersis dominated by crude oil
and petroleum products. The general cargo covers the rest of maritime trade,
increasingly dominated by containers but including also the so-called neo-bulks
(steel, timber, cars) as well as a miscellany of cargoes, largely in trades to
LDC's, that continue to travel in non-containerised form.
As iron ore and coal are the two largest volume traffics in the dry bulk
sector, the steel industry is a key factor in the dry bulk market. In the early
1990's the already modest growth in the carriage of coking coal and iron ore was
hit badly by a downturn in Japanese steel production. The adoption of new
technologies in steel-making has also tended to reduce the demand for these
primary inputs. Until recently, most analysts have therefore been fairly
pessimistic about the future prospects for these two key
commodities.9
There are recent signs that growth may be stronger than had been anticipated.
The OECD reports that, during 1995, largely because of a large increase in steel
production in the Republic of Korea and a recovery in Japan, iron ore shipments
increased by 4.4 percent, while coking coal volumes increase by a similar
percentage.10 More recent forecasts now suggest that world economic
growth during this period will provide the basis for fairly buoyant global
demand for this sector through the end of the decade.
Asia's share in this global total is large and expected to rise slightly. A
modest recovery in demand from Japan should be complemented by continued strong
growth in demand from Korea, with strong growth also from China. One recent
forecast suggests that total Asian imports of iron ore may increase from 154
million tonnes (49.4 percent of the world total) to 189 million tonnes (51.2
percent) by 2001.11
This demand is now primarily met by exports from Australia. Australian
exports now provide nearly 60 percentof Asian demand for iron ore, and this
percentage is likely, if anything, to edge up over the remainder of the decade.
The other major supplier to Asian markets is Brazil, with a little more than 25
percent of the Japanese market and around 16 percent of the Korea
market.12 A smaller and fairly stable percentage of East Asia's iron
ore needs is met from India.
While seaborne movements of coking coal have been depressed by slack
conditions in the steel industry, demand for steaming coal has been supported by
the energy demands of the newly industrialized economies of Asia, much of which
has been met by the construction of coal-fired generating plants. The decline in
European coal production has also offered new market opportunities for major
coal producers.
OECD reports strong growth in steaming coal shipments during 1995, with
volumes rising 7 percent from 219 million to 236 million tonnes. Much of this
growth is attributed to "strong growth in the shorthaul inter-Asian
trades."13 Drewry forecast similar rates of growth for seaborne trade
in steaming coal for the rest of the decade. Despite the continued rapid growth
in energy demand in East Asia over this period, this forecast may be a little
optimistic. WSTS estimates overall growth in coal shipments (steaming plus
coking coal) to rise at around 4.8 percent per annum for the rest of the decade.
A substantial part of this increase will come from the Far Eastern Newly
Industrialized Economies (FENIE's), in which demand is expected to grow at 8
percent per year, while demand from Japan should rise at around 3.8 percent.
Australia is the principal supplier of coal to most East Asian markets,
providing an estimated 60 percent of Japan's requirements in 1996, a similar
percentage of Taiwan's requirements and a somewhat smaller share of Korean
imports. Both the US and Canada are also important suppliers, shipping 16 and 25
million tonnes respectively in 1996 (compared to Australia's 100 million
tonnes).
However, these traditional suppliers are coming under increasing pressure
from exports from China, particularly in the steaming coal sector. From 5
million tonnes in 1980, exports of coal from China increased to approximately 20
million in 1991, and an estimated 33 million in 1996. A further increase of
about 60 percent is expected by the end of the decade. An estimated 75 percent
of this volume is imported by other Asian economies, principally Japan and
Korea: if this continues, China will supply between 15 percent and 20 percent of
Asia's coal import needs by 2001.14 Indonesia is also emerging as a
second major Asian coal exporter.
Seaborne grain trade enjoyed a very slow start to the 1990's, with no
significant growth recorded between 1990 to 1995. After a sharp rise in volumes
in 1996, the expectation is for moderate to strong growth for the rest of the
decade, with an increase in the order of 20 to 30 million tonnes (around 11
percent-16 percent of current world trade) by 2001.
There is considerable difference between sources on the geographical
distribution of likely growth. While the International Wheat Council expects
expansion to be "concentrated in Asia and Africa," WSTS estimates place most of
the growth in the Middle East and Latin America.15
At the present time grain imports to Asia stand at around 75 million tonnes
per year, of which Japan accounts for a little under 40 percent. Approximately
30 percent is accounted for by the East Asian FENIE's, while China's imports
account for more than 20 percent. The US is the dominant supplier, with 75
percent of the total Asian market. This dominance is clear in each subsector
except China, in which Canada holds about one-third of the market (Canada has
approximately 12 percent of the total Asian grain market).
Very little structural change is expected in this market over the next few
years. The most probable outcome is a modest volume increase (about 10 percent),
with a small decline in Japan's share of the total import market.
The most volatile segment of the market is probably imports to China. China
is a significant grain producer, and much of that country's current import
volume reflect regional supply/demand imbalances within the country and
under-developed inland transport systems. China exports substantial volumes of
coarse grains from its northern ports to other Asian countries. There is a
possibility that increased internal production and improved transportation
within China will substantially reduce its import volumes.
The oil price shocks of the 1970's did serious and lasting damage to the
world's seaborne carriage of crude oil and oil products. It was not until 1993
that total volumes recovered to the levels of 1980. Subsequent growth has been
sluggish, and is expected to remain so for the rest of the decade, with growth
rates in the order of 1.5 percent per annum.16
However, growth in Asian crude imports has been rising, and is likely to
continue to rise, at a higher rate. This is because widespread investment in new
refinery capacity, particularly in Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan, is leading
to the replacement of previous importation of refined product by the imports of
refinery feedstock.
A partial offset may come from an increase in the importation of petroleum
products by Japan. SS&Y Research Services reports that it expects the
relaxation of restrictions that prevent non-oil refiners from importing products
into Japan during 1996 will lead to a reduction in crude imports and an increase
in imports of refined product.17 If this eventuates, it is highly
likely that the additional product will be sourced from the new refineries
within Asia.
Drewry Shipping consultants has estimated that the Asian imports of crude oil
will increase to nearly 500 million tonnes per year by 2000.18 Of
this, approximately one-half will be destined for Japan: the remainder will be
distributed amongst a wide range of Southeast and East Asian nations. This
implies that crude oil imports to East Asia, including Japan, will increase at
approximately twice the rate than the world as a whole.
Despite China's substantial reserves of crude oil, the expansion of domestic
demand makes it unlikely that it will be a major supplier of crude to the
region. Exports of crude oil from China, which were reported at 36 million
tonnes in 1989, had fallen by 1995 to 19 million tonnes, only marginally in
excess of China's imports of 17 million tonnes.19 The overwhelming
majority of Asia's imports will continue to be sourced from the Middle East, as
they are at present.
The prospect for petroleum product trade is somewhat different. Increased
refining capacity within Asia will reduce the need for imports of product from
the Middle East. Indeed, most commentators expect a persistent excess of
refinery capacity to lead to intense competition to supply an increasing share
of Asian product needs from refineries elsewhere in Asia. Asian refineries
already supply approximately 50 percent of Japan's import requirements.
Total product imports to East Asia currently amount to around 112 million
tonnes per year, of which Japan's share is around 46 million. It is unlikely
that we will see a significant increase in this total in the next five years.
We have grown so accustomed to the rapid economic development of Asia that it
is easy to lose sight of just how severe the physical challenge of coping with
growth has been. There is no better way to remind ourselves than to examine the
increase in the volume of containers handled at Asian ports over the last
decade:
Table 2 shows the growth that has occurred in containers handled within each
of the major Asian economies during this period. It also shows some preliminary
forecastsbased on work in progress on a current ESCAP/Korea Maritime Institute
projectof anticipated volumes for 2000. By that time, East Asian ports will
handle around 47 percent of total world container throughput: by the year 2005,
this will probably reach 50 percent.
Table 2: Container Movements in East Asia History and Forecasts (000
TEU)
Source: Historical data from Containerisation International Yearbook
1997. Singapore figure for 1995 revised in accordance with data in
Containerisation International, March 1997, p 34. Forecasts are preliminary
estimates from current ESCAP/KMI research project on intra-Asian shipping.
Within this massive overall growth, there are several major structural
changes. As the four successive waves of Asian economic development have
occurred, the centre of gravity of container shipping operations has changed. In
the 1970's, Asia's container trades were Japan's container trades, and the
trans-Pacific trade was in effect a bilateral trade between the USA and Japan.
By 1985, this had changed dramatically. The diversification of Asian
container trade was already entering its mature phase. Container volumes from
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea comprised more than 40 percent of Asia's total,
while Japan's share had shrunk to 31 percent. Container volumes from the ASEAN
countries were still modest, but Singapore had began to emerge as a major global
hub: with total throughput of 1.7 million TEU, it was the sixth largest
container port in the world (two places behind New York/New Jersey).
By 1995, another profound change had occurred. During the decade 1985-1995,
container volumes through the ports of ASEAN countries increased six-fold, so
that by the end of the decade they collectively handled almost one-third of the
Asian total. The other three tiger economies continued to grow strongly,
maintaining their share at more than 40 percent. Japan ports now handled less
than one-fifth of all Asian container.
And something else was happening. The volume of containers handled by ports
on the mainland of China began to surge, increasing four-fold between 1990 and
1995. Information for 1996 is still rather sketchy, but Containerisation
International magazine reports that the throughput of Shanghaiwhich accounts
for approximately one-third of the total containers handled on the Chinese
mainlandincreased by 26.4 percent last year. It is unlikely that the ports of
the Pearl River delta grew more slowly than this, and it seems reasonable to
estimate that overall container volumes grew by around 25 percent. By the end of
the decade, the ports of mainland China will handle more than 10 percent of the
Asian total.
The other major transformation that has occurred is the growth importance of
container trades within Asia itself. The intra-Asian container trade has
consistently registered growth rates in excess of 10 percent per annum for more
than a decade, reaching almost double that figure, and is now recognised as the
second-largest container trade in the worldsecond only to the trans-Pacific
trade. The massive investment of Japan and the newly industrialised economies of
Asia in China, and the explosive growth of the container trade of that country,
as well as the increasing integration of the Southeast and Northeast Asian
economies suggests that there is not likely to be any abatement in this growth
in the foreseeable future.
Table 3 shows the scale of container flows within Asia. For the sake of
comparison, container flows between the major Asian sub-regions and North
America have also been included. The table also shows estimated container flows
in the year 2001. It can be seen that the intra-Asian trade, which is now around
80 percent of the trade between Asia and North America, will be approximately
equal to that trade at the beginning of the next decade.
Table 3: Estimated Intra-Asian and Trans-Pacific Container Flows1996 and
2000 (000 TEU)
Source: Derived form WSTS.
* Far East newly industrialised economies: Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
While there have been major changes in the scale and pattern of Asian demand
for maritime transport, there have also been a number of changes occurring on
the supply side.
The most striking of these has been the increasing Asian participation in
ownership of the world shipping fleet. Over the last two decades, Korea, China,
Singapore, and Taiwan have joined Japan and Hong Kong as major ship owning
nations. Table 4 indicates that, between them, these six economies now control
approximately 30 percent of the total world shipping tonnage. (ships
beneficially owned but operated under an open registry flag are included in the
totals for each economy).
Table 4: Leading Asian Shipowning Economies
Source: OECD, Review of Maritime Transport.
Some indication of how things are likely to move over the next few years can
be gleaned from the fact that, according to UNCTAD, the developing countries of
Asia, which in 1995 controlled approximately 17 percent of the world fleet, took
delivery of 27 percent of the total new tonnage delivered.
The increasing strength of the Asian shipowning sector is nowhere more clear
than in the container shipping sector. Of the 20 largest container shipping
lines in the world, fully half are owned and based in Asia: 3 in Japan, 2 in
Taiwan, 2 in Korea, and one each in Hong Kong, China, and Singapore (Table 5).
Table 5: Leading Asian Container Lines, 1996
Source: Containerisation International.
In addition, the strength of intra-Asian container trade growth and
the maritime aspirations of countries such as Malaysia have served to ensure
that the "second tier" of Asia operators is exceptionally strong, with companies
such as MISC, Wan Hai, RCL, Kien Hung and PIL adding considerable depths to the
ranks of container shipping lines based in the region.
Once again, there is every likelihood that Asian carriers' presence in the
container shipping market will consolidate and continue to increase. The
expected strength of Asian trade growth will provide the opportunity, and there
are clear signs that the major Asian carriers have no intention of neglecting
it: the top 10 Asian carriers listed in Table 5 are responsible for greater than
25 percent of known worldwide orders for new container vessels.
Global Alliances
1996 saw a radical restructuring of corporate alignments in the liner
shipping sector, and long-standing consortia and operating agreements were
abandoned in favour of new "global alliances."
While cooperative arrangements have long been a feature of liner shipping,
they have traditionally been arranged on a "trade land by trade line" basis. A
line would work with one set of partners in the trade between Europe and Asia,
and another in the trade between Asia and North America. The significance of the
new alliances lies both in their scope and their scale: they are larger than
anything before, and they have the avowed intention of allowing the alliance
partners to establish a global service network.
There are three principal alliances:
1. Global Alliance: APL, MOL, OOCL, Nedlloyd (and MISC)
2. Grand Alliance: P&O, Hapag-Lloyd, NOL and NYK
3. Sea-Land/Maersk
Hanjin Shipping has also formed a close co-operation with the Tricon
partners, which is sometimes listed as a fourth global alliance, but the scale
and port coverage of this grouping falls short of the other three.
There is much debate about the extent to which these alliances will dominate
the global liner business and about their stability. With respect to the first
of these, the main challenge to their dominance appears to be the major
independent carriers of Asia: lines such as Evergreen, Cosco, Hyundai and
Yangming. With regard to the second, a major threat has already emerged in the
form of the merger between P&O and Nedlloyd, two companies which are members
of rival alliances.
Changes in Service Patterns
In the liner shipping sector, the successive waves of Asian economic
development have brought with them significant changes in the geographical
structure of line services in the intercontinental trades to and from Asia.
Briefly tracing the history of the trade between Asia and North America:
1. In the earliest phase, container shipping services concentrated largely on
providing quality services between Japan and both the East and West Coasts of
the United States, with East coast services transiting the Panama canal;
2. As economic activity in Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan grew, an increasing
number of lines began providing direct shipping services to these locations.
Initially this was done in conjunction with a service to Japan, and this is
still the pattern in the case of services to Korea. Recently, many operators
introduced additional dedicated service to the Southern ports of East Asia.
Towards the end of this phase, the spread of intermodal services in the US led
to a decline in service transiting the Panama Canal in favor of landbridging
from West coast ports to the Midwest and even to East Coast destinations.
3. As economic development of Southeast Asia took off in the second half of
the 1980's, major consortia began to introduce services that extended westwards
to Singapore, transhipping cargoes from other Southeast destinations through
that port.
4. With further growth in Southeast Asia, a new strategy for serving the East
Coast of the USA was introduced, with vessels proceeding from Asia via the Suez
Canal. This proves an attractive option for cargoes from Taiwan and Hong Kong as
well as from Southeast Asia. Lines also begin to experiment with additional
calls at Southeast Asian ports: Port Klang in Malaysia, Laem Chabang in
Thailand.
5. With the rapid growth in Chinese cargoes, improved handling facilities at
mainland China ports and congestion in Hong Kong because of delays in the
construction of Terminal 9, major lines begin to experiment with direct calls at
mainline ports, collecting cargoes previously transhipped through Hong Kong or
Japanese ports.
Phase 6, yet to commence, will see:
The massive growth in container traffic, changes in route patterns, and the
never-ending search for economies of scale in container ship operations led APL
in 1986 to place orders for the first "post-Panamax"
containerships.21
It was several years before any other company followed suit, but in 1989 the
French national carrier CGM ordered a single vessel, to be followed one month
later by Malaysian carrier MISC. From then on, the trickle became a flood: by
mid-1996, there were 45 post-Panamax vessels in service. At the same time
unfilled orders for post-Panamax vessels comprised more than 20 percent of the
total container ship capacity on order, and nearly one-half of the capacity for
large vessels.22
From the point of view of the present paper, the most significant point is
that all of these new large vessels will be deployed to and from Asia: either on
the trans-Pacific, and on services between Northern Europe and Asia. This will
place enormous demands on Asian portsthese ships are longer, deeper and
considerably broader than the Panamax vessels that they will replace. Moreover,
the vast increases in carrying capacity will require an extremely high standard
of terminal performance if the economies of scale are not to be undermined by
excessive time spent in port.
Catering for the vast increase in Asian international trades requires not
only a major increase in shipping capacity, but also the vast quantity of fixed
investment in port facilities. In 1994, ESCAP estimated that meeting the needs
of Asia's maritime trades would require an investment of around $25.5 billion
dollars between 1994 and 2000. However, the forecasts on the basis of which this
estimate was made now appear to be conservative; ESCAP notes that the
methodology used "results in a significant underestimation of the investment
requirements."23 Total port investment requirements may well be in
excess of $10 billion per year.
Partly in response to this need and partly as a result of a broader policy
shift towards market solution, there has been a significant liberalization of
port policy in most Asian jurisdictions, with a proliferation of BOO and BOOT
schemes and other strategies for encouraging private investment in and operation
of port facilities. An associated development has been the emergence of
international port companies: P & O Ports (Australia), Hutchison
International Terminals (Hong Kong) and International Container Services Inc
(Philippines) have all adopted aggressive expansion plans that extend far beyond
their country of origin. The Port of Singapore has also signaled its intention
to internationalize, and has made this intention concrete in a major venture in
China.24
In this paper, I have attempted to introduce a few of the major developments
that have taken place in the Asian seaborne trade, and to take a preliminary
look at likely future developments. There is much that is uncertain about how
the maritime sector will develop in the future, but there are a few things about
which we can be confident:
Changes in the Geography of Asian Trade
Demand for Maritime Transport
Dry Bulk Cargoes
Iron Ore
Coal
Grain
Liquid Bulk Cargoes
Containers
Economy
1985
1990
1995
2000
Japan
5,517
7,851
10,740
13,500
Taiwan Province of China
3,075
5,430
7,848
12,000
Hong Kong
2,289
5,100
12,549
16,000
Singapore
1,699
5,223
11,800
17,500
South Korea
1,246
2,348
4,502
7,400
Philippines
638
1,383
1,707
2,900
PRC
446
1,143
4,678
10,900
Thailand
400
1,078
1,962
4,000
Malaysia
389
882
2,086
4,600
Indonesia
229
922
2,197
5,300
EAST ASIA TOTAL
15,928
31,360
60,100
94,100
1996
Japan
FENIE*
SE Asia
China
USA
Canada
Japan
0
825
625
218
833
60
FENIE*
417
926
596
715
912
60
SE Asia
413
606
n.a.
n.a.
751
41
China
590
821
n.a.
n.a.
1,486
63
US
1,143
1,640
667
293
0
18
Canada
229
150
64
56
42
0
2000
Japan
FENIE*
SE Asia
China
USA
Canada
Japan
-
1,263
976
314
967
75
FENIE*
637
1,633
1,044
1,507
1,074
82
SE Asia
606
1,115
n.a.
n.a.
1,123
60
China
967
1,030
n.a.
n.a.
1,703
97
US
1,463
2,576
987
440
-
22
Canada
309
226
86
74
59
- Supply Side Developments
The Rise of Asian Ship Ownership
Tonnage (dwt)
Share
Japan
86,770
12.93%
China
35,246
5.25%
Hong Kong
31,331
4.67%
Korea
20,930
3.12%
Taiwan
14,370
2.14%
Singapore
12,998
1.94%
Combined
201,645
30.05%
World Total
671,184
100.00% Asian Liner Operators
Total TEU
Company
Ranking
Capacity
No. Ships
Evergreen/Uniglory
1
204,061
103
Cosco
4
163,650
149
NYK/TSK Line
5
127,400
76
Mitsui OSK Line
6
121,085
71
Hanjim Shipping
7
111,900
45
Hyundai Merchant Marine
9
101,992
32
K-Line
13
82,331
47
Yangming Marine Transport
14
80,058
33
OOCL
15
76,514
28
Neptune Orient Line/PUL
19
57,379
35
Increases in Vessel Scale
Port Investment
Conclusion
Endnotes