By 1775 the American rebels had taken Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point from the British, strategic points of entry to the New England colonies. The British attempt in 1776 to recapture Fort Ticonderoga failed, but in July of 1777, they swept down from Canada taking the Fort and pursuing the retreating Americans south. On July 7, 1777, a rear guard action by the Americans at Hubbardton, Vermont, successfully stalled the advancing British, allowing the main army to safely retreat through West Rutland, Vermont, to Fort Edward, New York.
The battle between American rear guard troops and British and German forces was the only revolutionary war battle fought on Vermont soil. At the time, the ultimate British objective was to separate New England from the other colonies. Hubbardton was the first of several battles offering resistance to the British invasion from Canada. The victory at Bennington followed on August 16, 1777, and the last two decisive battles near Saratoga resulted in a British surrender on October 17.
Figure 1. Strategy of the Burgoyne Campaign. This diagram shows the three-pronged attach planned by the British to conquer the Champlain, Mohawk and Hudson valleys that converge on Albany. How failed to start up the Hudson; St. Leger was stopped halfway to Albany; and Burgoyne was stopped at Saratoga. (Based on a map from The Mt. Independence-Hubbardton 1776 Military Road by Mabel and Joseph Wheeler, J.L. Wheeler, Benson, Vermont 1968.)
To understand the Battle of Hubbardton more fully, we must first return to July 5, 1777, at Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain and to Major General Arthur St. Clair, the American commander of both that Fort and Mount Independence, directly across the Lake in Vermont. St. Clair had recently returned to the Fort, from the winter campaigns in New Jersey with General Washington. For three weeks St. Clair commanded what was considered by the Americans and the British as the impregnable guardian of the Champlain Valley&emdash;the thoroughfare between Fort Edward on the Hudson River and St. Jean on the Richelieu River.
The Ticonderoga position included the Fort itself and its companion the hastily built defenses of Mount Independence, sometimes referred to as Fort Independence in Vermont. These defenses were connected by a great boom and a floating bridge across a narrow neck of the Lake. It was an elaborate defensive system, far beyond the physical capability of the American garrison. The entire complex was dominated by Sugar Hill (later renamed Mount Defiance by the British) on the New York side, which the Americans had insufficient troops to occupy. St. Clair's Northern Army consisted of ten Continental and four three month militia regiments, two of which had just been gathered and had entered the Fort two days previously.(1)
British Lieutenant General John Burgoyne's expeditionary force, some 7,400 strong was pushing south from Canada, menacing the approximately 4,000 American troops and the fort)fications on both sides of the Lake. The British were west on the New York side of the Lake, and their allied German troops on the east in Vermont. (2) (The Germans were serving the British army but under the command of their own officers, subordinate only to General Burgoyne.) The British and German troops were well armed, well trained, and well fed, and tempered by a year of campaigning in the north. They had been in pursuit of the Americans who were retreating from the disastrous attack on Quebec in December of 1775.
St. Clair's troops were commanded by a number of offficers who had retreated ahead of the British from Quebec, among them Colonel Seth Warner. But for the most part the men at Fort Ticonderoga were not veterans, and the army was weakened by the convalescence of hundreds of men who had had the measles, and by about one hundred who were in the hospital, mostly with wounds.(3) Although some units were well armed and clothed, most wete poorly clad, many were not in uniforms and many were short of bayonets.(4)
On the morning of July 5 on the top of Sugar Hill (the hill the Americans lacked the troops to occupy), the British were manhandling twelve pounder cannon. When mounted, these would command the American positions at Fort Ticonderoga just below, and the western portions of Mount Independence, just across the narrows of Lake Champlain. At the same time, and even more sign)ficantly, the German troops were moving to outflank Mount Independence on the Vermont shore in an attempt to close the only route of withdrawal of St. Clair's troops to the south.
The Germans did not succeed. St. Clair and his troops withdrew from Mt. Independence just in time. Actually, the Germans upon hearing of St. Clair's evacuation came across East Creek by boat. (East Creek separates the Mount Independence peninsula from the main Vermont shore. See Figure 2.) Although the cannon on Sugar Hill never presented a major threat to Americans, especially at Mount Independence, which is mostly out of effective range, the British troops had an ideal observation post for selecting targets for the large number of cannon on the lower level aimed toward the Fort and Mount Independence.
Figure 2. Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence (Drawing by Ellen Viereck. From Independence Must be Won by Phillip and Ellen Viereck, John Day, Co., New York 1964. Reproduced with permission from the artist and publisher.)
The Battle of Hubbardton occurred when the British and their German allies overtook the American rear guard that was protecting the main body of General Arthur St. Clair's retreating Northern Army. The rear guard delayed the pursuing British and was just about to continue its withdrawal&emdash;as a rear guard should&emdash;when the British attacked, forcing the Americans to turn upon them in self defense. It was a terrific battle at close quarters, and the Americans nearly had the upperhand when the supporting German Brunswick troops arrived, forcing the Americans to withdraw across the mountains to the east. The British blocked the Castleton road to the south and continued their encirclement to the northeast as far as Pittsford ridge. A desperate, running fight along and below the ridge concluded the Battle, as the Americans struggled to free themselves from the cul-de-sac that almost entrapped them. The Americans had fired the first shot at 5:00 a.m. The last scattering shots along the ridge were over by 10:00 a.m.
The principal characters involved in this military drama on the American side were Colonel Seth Warner, commander of the entire rear guard at Hubbardton as well as his own Green Mountain Boy Continental regiment and some Vermont militia; Colonel Ebenezer Francis, commander of the rear guard during its march from Mount Independence to Hubbardton, as well as his own 11th Massachusetts Continental regiment; and Colonel Nathan Hale, commander of the 2nd New Hampshire Continental regiment, who was also in command of a large group of invalids, walking sick, and stragglers. The total number of rear guard troops is estimated to have been nearly 1200.(5)
On the British side were Brigadier General Simon Fraser (killed in action at Saratoga three months later), commander of the elite and fast moving Advance Corps; Major General Baron Friederich von Riedesel, commander of the German Brunswick troops; Major Alexander Lindsay, the Earl of Balcarres, successor to Fraser at Saratoga and commander of the light infantry; Major John Dyke Acland (wounded on Pittsford ridge) and commander of the grenadiers; and Major Robert Grant commander of the British Advance Guard.
The Battle, although it involved a relatively small number of troops, was much more important in the Burgoyne Campaign of 1777 than generally realized. As the first pitched battle of the Campaign, it gave the British their first view that year of the fighting qualities of the colonial rebels. Although the British must be credited with breaking up the rear guard, they failed to defeat it, as evidenced by the escape of roughly sixty seven percent of the American troops, with many of the men fighting again at Bennington and Saratoga. The British had overtaken the rebel "tiger" who turned on them in a most unexpected and ferocious manner. This deadly opposition was what they could expect from that point on. Fraser spoke of being in the "most disaffected part of America, every person a spy," and Burgoyne spoke of "a gathering storm" on his left.
The Battle was the first meeting in close combat between the British/German troops and the Americans in the Saratoga Campaign of 1777. The British losses in light infantry at Hubbardton may well have weakened them for Saratoga. The Americans observed the efficiency of the British maneuvers that enveloped their left flank and the German maneuvers on their right flank. Learning their lesson well, the Americans went on to use these very tactics at Bennington on August 16, 1777.
There can be no doubt that the Battle was well fought on both sides. Major Alexander Lindsay, only twenty four at the time, led the British light infantry and is said to have had thirteen musket ball holes in his clothing&emdash;though he was only slightly wounded. He test)fied later, "Circumstanced as the enemy was, as an army very hard pressed in their retreat, they certainly behaved with great gallantry." General Philip Schuyler, the American commander of the Northern Department, and St. Clair's immediate superior, wrote to Colonel Warner after the Battle, asking him to "thank the troops in my name for behaving so well as you say they did at Hubbardton." On behalf of the British, General Burgoyne pronounced the Battle a "signal engagement," and he wrote that the Germans "entered the action in the handsomest manner possible."
The Battle is a classic example of a rear guard action. This security measure, which guards retreating troops, has been learned through experience, sometimes disastrous, gained through the centuries. Both Colonel Ebenezer Francis, who commanded the rear guard during the forced march from Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and Seth Warner who commanded the reinforced rear guard at Hubbardton, were following a certain set of military concepts. To fully appreciate the Battle of Hubbardton, it is important to understand these concepts:
