Sucker Brook formed the first natural defensive line north of Monument Hill. Although the stream is a minor obstacle, its banks on the south side offered limited defensive, defilade, positions for delaying the enemy. These were enhanced beyond a doubt by hastily thrown up log defenses and abatis, as described by Joshua Pell in his diary.
Thus, when Major Robert Grant and his advance guard ahead of the light infantry and the grenadiers (see the three "A's" north of Sucker Brook) approached the Sucker Brook crossing on the Hubbardton Military Road, the force was apparently halted while Grant reconnoitered from a stump, where he was shot dead. There were twenty-one rank and file casualties reported. The troops were in column but promptly deployed into line on the east and west sides of the crossing probably for several hundred yards. The map shows deployment.
Gerlach delineates this: "A" Advanced Corps of Brig. Gen. Fraser which was attacked at "B". He then shows "B" at four American positions, three on the south side of the brook, one on the north side, possibly the picket that killed Grant. These were undoubtedly company size units into which the pickets had hastily withdrawn. These companies are said by Gerlach to have attacked at "B," that is, they defended the south bank by musket fire from defilade and log and tree defenses.
Note: a higher quality reproduction of this map is coming soon. Click on the image and scroll to the right, or enlarge your screen to see the full image.
From the standpoint of the approaching British, the musket fire was appropriately called an attack, since they were on the receiving end. From the American position it was a defensive, delaying action.
The British deployed along the north bank and crossed the brook penetrating the delaying obstacles as the Americans withdrew to their regiments on Monument Hill as shown by the withdrawal lines from "B" to "O." The British now took post at "C," the position of that Corps while it was forming (for the assault on the hill). The American units had now withdrawn up the hill to positions shown at "O" to join their parent units. It should be noted that the lines of withdrawal shown by Gerlach are to the center where Francis's original rear guard was located. The American units shown on the north end show no lines of withdrawal from Sucker Brook, into those units, suggesting that Hale's men, under Titcomb, (on the north or right flank) were not a part of the delaying force at the brook, except for Captain Carr's company and the straggler group mentioned below. Likewise none of the delaying units withdrew to Warner either. The exception is the American unit on the extreme west (left flank), also identified by "B," showing no British units opposing it, though most certainly there would have been deployment that far west. Almost certainly this was Captain Carr's company of Hale's 2nd New Hampshire that apparently was detached to Warner as a security outpost to warn of a possible attack from that quarter as explained in the text. There appears to have been an old road to the Manchester farm in that area that might have been used by the British as an approach road. The three hundred or so sick, invalids, and stragglers brought in by Hale would have been attached to Captain Carr's company since they lacked organization of their own. Captain Carr was one of Hale's officers.
At "D" is shown the Earl of Balcarras detached to cover the Right Wing. Strangely, Gerlach does not show the grenadiers, also ordered by Fraser to support the right when it was observed that the advance guard was engaged with Warner's troops and in need of support. "D" extended across the Castleton road, blocking the road from further American withdrawal. It shows only the early phase of the envelopment, omitting the final phase to the top of Pittsford Ridge. Fraser described this clearly. It appears that Balcarras was given command of both the light infantry detachment and the Grenadiers to make the rapid envelopment of Warner's left flank and to secure the road to Castleton.
The American position at "O," the position of the enemy [the Rebels] previous to the action, shows the Americans along the crest of Monument Hill. It does not show them assembled to march on the Castleton road, from which they moved to the position along the crest at "O. " Gerlach would not have been aware of this. Warner's units are thought to be the two units on the south, just off the crest. Francis's units more than likely are shown as the three next toward the north, and probably Hale's (under Titcomb) are shown as the two at the extreme north facing "E." "E" was "The Vanguard and Brunswick company of Chasseurs coming up with General Riedesel." The Germans arrived during the very last phase of the main battle. Gerlach tried to include all phases of the Battle on one map, but omitted the British and German envelopments in their final stages.
At 'T" is shown the American position behind the high log fence after General Riedesel arrived. However, it again fails to show the Americans on the right flank threatening the exposed British left, so clearly described by both Fraser and Riedesel.
At "E" the German units are shown advancing on the American right flank, but it is suggestive only and fails to show them threatening the flank and rear of the Americans as clearly described by Riedesel. The diagram shows the German advance parallel to the British but following the contour of the hill.
At "G" Retreat of the Enemy, the map fails to show the grenadiers on the ridge ahead of the Americans as described by Fraser, Anburey, and Bird. It fails to show the Americans being blocked on the ridge, although it does depict the grenadiers and light infantry detachment approaching the ridge. Thus the concept is presented, if not the completion of the action. Realistically, the retreating lines would have turned toward the north &endash; as suggested by Fraser when the Americans found themselves blocked on the south and east. At this position, one of the two units shown appears to represent the detachment of light infantry under Lindsay, Earl of Balcarras, and the other the grenadiers.
The remote American unit on the extreme west and south, with its lines of withdrawal into Warner's sector, is thought to be Captain Carr's company, as we have said, the security outpost on Warner's left flank. It will be noted that there is a single line of withdrawal to the southeast just ahead of Lindsay's advancing units (at "M" extended), suggesting that some of these men escaped the envelopment that is shown only in its early stage. These would have been some of the invalids, sick, and stragglers, it seems logical to conclude, although most of that group were captured. A line of escape to the southeast is clearly shown from "F," the southern most position shown for the Rebels.
"H," the position after the action represents the defensive positions taken up immediately by the Germans at Fraser's request after Riedesel inquired as to what dispositions of his troops were desired. When the Germans left the next day the British took over these positions for the remaining night.
"I," the House Where the Wounded Were Carried, is beyond question the Selleck cabin, thought to have been used by Warner as his headquarters.
As John Clement explains, Gerlach and his assistants came up after the Battle was over. He sketched it in the late afternoon of July 7, and left early the next day, in a place full of almost about 570 dead, wounded, and prisoners; as welt as exhausted troops. He, too, must have been exhausted.
Gerlach merely tried to capture the general concept of the action without attempting any detail or unit identification. The entire picture could not have been clear to anyone, even Fraser, it appears, much less to the German cartographer who was not present at the Battle and who probably did not speak English. Fraser was killed at Saratoga and thus was not available to correct the map when it was later published in England. In the limited time and under the conditions, he did a remarkable piece of work. The map is a tremendous help. As John Clement said, " There is no other source material that can begin to compare with it," its peculiarities and omissions notwithstanding.
Note: The scale of 200 paces to the inch is based upon the German pace of five feet, measured as the distance of two (2-1/2 feet each) steps, rather than our pace of one long step of 3 feet.(1) See John Clement's clarifying description in Joseph and Mabel Wheeler, The Mount Indepen,dence Hubbardton Military Road, (VHS: Benson,VT: J.L. Wheeler, 1968). pp. 221-224.
