

## 1. Recap

$S$  knows that  $p$  iff: (1)  $S$  believes that  $p$ , (2) it's true that  $p$ , (3)  $S$  is justified in believing that  $p$ , and (4)  $S$ 's belief that  $p$  hasn't been Gettiered.

Foundationalism, coherentism, and externalism are all theories of justification (and hence deal with the third condition on knowledge).

Doxastic theories hold that only beliefs can justify beliefs. However, they face a version of the Isolation Objection.

Internalism is the view that if  $x$  justifies  $S$ 's belief that  $p$ , then  $x$  is one of  $S$ 's mental states.

- All doxastic theories are internalist.
- However, not all internalist theories are doxastic, namely when mental states that are not beliefs (such as perceptual or memory states) can justify. Ex. Pollock & Cruz's (P&C's) "direct realism."

Externalism claims that things *other* than  $S$ 's mental states can justify  $S$ 's beliefs. These include the reliability (objective probability) of  $S$ 's cognitive processes, the environment in which those processes are exercised, etc.

P&C's objectives: (1) to present "a general account of epistemic justification," and (2) to show why all externalist theories fail to satisfy this very general account.

## 2. Epistemic Norms

### 2.1. *The general account of justification*

- Epistemic justification for  $p \approx$  permission to believe that  $p \approx$  rules of correct reasoning
- Permissions are a kind of norm.
- Norms are general descriptions of the circumstances under which various kinds of judgments and actions are correct.

*Third-person accounts of norms:* when one person uses norms to evaluate the behavior of another.

*First-person accounts of norms:* when one person's behavior is guided by her following a norm.

- P&C call these *procedural norms*.

Epistemology has focused on *procedural norms*, but only those that govern what we ought to *believe*.

### 2.2. *How do epistemic norms regulate? Three views*

*Intellectualists* hold that  $S$ 's reasoning is governed by norm  $N$  only if  $S$  follows an explicit rule  $R_N$  that is equivalent to  $N$ .

- *Problem:*  $S$  can follow  $R_N$  correctly or incorrectly. So there is norm  $N^*$  governing  $S$ 's following of  $R_N$ . However, then  $S$  must follow an explicit rule  $R_{N^*}$  that is equivalent to  $N^*$ . A regress ensues.

*Dogmatists* hold that  $S$  can only use reasoning to criticize reasoning/applying epistemic norms to other forms of reasoning, but there is some form of reasoning that is antecedent to our epistemic norms. (All reasoning is innocent until proven guilty.)

- *Problem:* Some reasoning does not appear innocent until proven guilty (wishful thinking, gambler's fallacy, etc.)

*Proceduralists* hold that  $S$ 's reasoning is governed by norm  $N$  only if  $S$  knows how to reason in accordance with  $N$ . (P&C's position.)

- Knowing-how to do  $x \neq$  (explicitly) knowing that  $y$  is the way to do  $x$ . (So this isn't intellectualism.)
- Know-how is a kind of *competence* (an *ability* to do something correctly); correct exercises of that ability are *performances*.

## 3. Externalism Refuted?

Internalism holds:

1. *Belief internalism:* If, according to some epistemic norm,  $x$  justifies  $S$ 's belief, then  $x$  is one of  $S$ 's internal states.
2. *Norm internalism:* If an epistemic norm is correct, then it is *necessarily* correct, and immune to criticism/revision.

### 3.1. Belief externalism

Belief externalists deny belief internalism:

(BE) It's possible that, according to some epistemic norm,  $x$  justifies  $S$ 's belief, but  $x$  is not one of  $S$ 's internal states.

- Ex. "Reliabilist Norm" If belief  $b$  is the result of a reliable cognitive process, then  $b$  is justified.

#### 3.1.1. The Guidance Objection to Belief Externalism

G1. If belief externalism is true, then, it's possible that, according to some epistemic norm,  $x$  justifies  $S$ 's belief, but  $x$  is not one of  $S$ 's internal states. (BE)

G2. If  $x$  is not one of  $S$ 's internal states, then  $S$ 's belief cannot be guided by  $x$ .

G3. Epistemic norms are first-person norms:  $S$ 's belief must be guided by an epistemic norm.

G4.  $\therefore$  Belief externalism is not true (G1-G3)

### 3.2. Norm externalism

Norm externalists deny norm internalism:

(NE) It is possible that an epistemic norm is correct, but only *contingently* so, and/or for that norm to be susceptible to criticism/revision.

It is possible to be a norm *externalist* but a belief *internalist*. (If the Guidance Objection moves you, then this is a good way to go.)

- Ex. Take two internalist norms (a rule of logic and wishful thinking). Norm externalists could argue that the first is better than the latter because it is more reliable.

Two motivations for norm externalism:

- *Discovery thesis*: If our old reasoning patterns are unreliable *and we discover this*, then we should alter our norms and reasoning accordingly.
- *Brute reliability thesis*: If our old reasoning patterns are unreliable ~~and we discover this~~, then we should alter our norms and reasoning accordingly.

#### 3.2.1. Discovery thesis refuted

D1. If  $S$  discovers that her old reasoning patterns are unreliable, then  $S$  has an internal state that represents her old reasoning patterns as unreliable.

D2. *The Reasoning Pattern Norm*: If  $S$  has an internal state that represents her old reasoning patterns as unreliable, then  $S$  should alter her old reasoning patterns accordingly.

D3. If  $S$  revises her old reasoning patterns in conformity with the Reasoning Pattern Norm, she does not revise the Reasoning Pattern Norm.

D4.  $\therefore$  The Discovery Thesis is false. (D1-D3)

D5. The Reasoning Pattern Norm is consistent with norm internalism.

D6.  $\therefore$  The Discovery Thesis fails to support norm externalism (D1, D2, D5).

#### 3.2.2. Brute reliability thesis refuted

(This is essentially a version of the Guidance Objection: if we can't have an internal representation of the unreliability of a reasoning pattern, then it can't guide us to change our reasoning patterns.)

## 4. Relativism

### 4.1. *From internalism to relativism?*

R1. Either epistemic norms are universal or individuals can differ with respect to their epistemic norms.

R2. If epistemic norms are universal, then everyone has the same epistemic norms.

R3. Not everyone has the same epistemic norms.

R4.  $\therefore$  Individuals can differ with respect to their epistemic norms. (R1-R3)

R5. If an epistemic norm is correct, then it is *necessarily* correct, and immune to criticism/revision. (Norm Internalism)

R6.  $\therefore$  If individuals can differ with respect to their epistemic norms, then necessarily, they are both correct, and immune to (each other's) criticisms. (=Relativism, R4, R5)

4.2. *P&C's responses*

*R3 is debatable.* In particular, we should distinguish between everybody *following* the same epistemic norms (which is implausible) and everyone *being governed* by the same epistemic norms (which is plausible.) But if everyone is governed by the same epistemic norms, then those who don't follow those norms can be criticized for not following the norms that govern them.

*R4 and R5 don't entail Relativism.* Rather, they entail: If individuals can differ with respect to their epistemic norms *and those norms are correct*, then they are immune to each other's criticisms. But that isn't all that controversial.

## 4.2.1. Nasty relativism?

P&C focus on rebutting an especially 'nasty' kind of relativism:

- Suppose that there are two individuals who are given the *same inputs*. However, one person's norms entail that a belief *b* is justified, and another's entail that this same belief *b* is unjustified.

Here's P&C's critique of nasty relativism:

1. A concept is determined by its rational role: what reasons justify it, and what claims it can justify.
2. Epistemic norms determine rational roles.
3. ∴ If two individuals can differ with respect to their epistemic norms, then they differ with respect to their concepts. (1-2)
4. If two individuals differ with respect to their concepts, then, when given the same inputs, their norms will justify different beliefs (e.g. one agent will have a belief *b* that is justified, and another will claim that a different belief *b\** is unjustified).
5. If two individuals are given the same inputs, but their norms justify different beliefs, then nasty relativism is false.
6. ∴ Nasty relativism is false. (3-5)